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7.

The boundary between the not-for-profit and
business sectors: social enterprise and hybrid
models
Benjamin M Leff

1. INTRODUCTION
It is conventional to think of not-for-profit organizations as inhabiting a sector distinct
from the private business sector on one side and the government sector on the other. 1
This third sector goes by various names but it generally consists of nonprofit
organizations, most of which are devoted to some social or charitable purpose. 2 The
nonprofit sector is generally distinguished from the business sector (i) by the fact that it
does not pursue its objectives for the purpose of enriching its participants and (ii) by
the fact that it is generally limited to certain activities, which are directed at improving
society, sometimes called 'social' goals. 3 But the boundary between the nonprofit and
business sectors has always been indistinct and subject to contestation,4 and over the
course of the past several decades, this boundary has become more blurred. Many of
the ways in which the boundary between the nonprofit and business sectors has become
blurred are due to changes in culture, business practices, and institutional norms. But
there has also been a movement to change the laws that apply to the nonprofit sector,
either through legislation or, · more often, through nonprofits innovating to push the
boundaries of existing law. While these legal changes are occurring in many jurisdictions around the world, the focus of this chapter is the United States.
One of the traditional goals of law in the nonprofit sector has been to distinguish
entities in the nonprofit sector from those in the business sector - to define and police
1

See generally Burton A Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Economy (Harvard University Press
1988) 41.
2
Brice S McKeever, Nathan E Dietz and Saunji D Fyffe, The Nonprofit Almanac (9th edn,
Urban Institute Press 2016) 2 ('[the nonprofit sector] is also referred to as the charitable,
voluntary, tax exempt, independent, third, social, or philanthropic sector'.)
3
Another way of thinking about the primary distinction between the nonprofit and business
sectors is that 'the for-profit organization has owners who hold the equity in the enterprise, such
as stockholders of a corporation. The for-profit organization is operated for the benefit of its
owners'. Nonprofits, by contrast, do not have owners, and are generally operated for some
purpose, and any excess value (profits) they accrue is used for that purpose: Bruce R Hopkins,
The Law of Tax Exempt Organizations (11th edn, Wiley 2016) 28 (§ 1.1).
4
This state of affairs is nicely described in Miranda Stewart, 'The Boundaries of Charity
and Tax' in Matthew Harding, Ann O'Connell and Miranda Stewatt (eds), Not-for-Profit Law:
Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 201.4) 232 ('the tax law
of charities thereby constitutes (together with other laws and norms) the boundaries of the state,
charity and the market in a "jumbled mixed economy" that changes over time').
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the boundary. That boundary is defined by law for a number of reasons, the most
obvious of which is that the government provides benefits to enterprises that are in the
nonprofit sector that it withholds from enterprises in the business sector. The reason tax
scholars study nonprofits is that one of the most salient of those benefits in most
jurisdictions is some kind of preferential tax treatment, such as exemption from
corporate income taxes and a tax subsidy for donations. 5 But tax benefits are only one
of the distinguishing characteristics of the nonprofit sector, and numerous other
governmental benefits exist. Whenever the government provides special benefits, legal
distinction must be made between the organizations that qualify for those benefits, and
the organizations that do not.
The possibility of receiving favourable treatment is not the only reason that a legal
boundary between nonprofits and businesses might be justified. The second reason is to
enable nonprofits to communicate to stakeholders that the organizations are worthy of
support. This rationale - what we might call the 'branding' function of nonprofit law might support a quite different regulatory regime than the one required to distinguish
between entities worthy of specific governmental benefits and those that are not. This
'branding' function is essential to the leading economic theory of the nonprofit form,
which posits that firms adopt the nonprofit form as a sort of off-the-shelf contract
between patrons and a firm, when the firm provides goods or services the quality of
which is hard for patrons to evaluate.6 Under this theory, by using the 'non-distribution
constraint' to solve 'contract failure' (or reduce agency costs) the nonprofit firm is able
to provide certain goods or services to patrons in the most economically efficient
manner.
The nonprofit form is only the most economically efficient arrangement, however, if
it is relatively easy for patrons to understand the basic contours of the non-distribution
· constraint and, most importantly, to identify which firms are subject to it. In other
words, the boundary between the nonprofit sector and the business sector must be
clearly drawn. Even without expressly accepting this economic argument, many
observers of the nonprofit sector believe that its existence depends on a level of trust
among stakeholders that requires clear differentiation from the ordinary business sector,
and that this ability of stakeholders to. trust nonprofit enterprises more than they trust
pure business enterprises creates substantial value.7 Whatever the rationale, laws are
used to create and police the boundary between the nonprofit sector and the business
sector. Therefore, when there are legal reforms that complicate or alter the boundary,
these reforms should be evaluated not only with respect to whether they adequately
See generally Hopkins (n 3) 77 § 3.4.
See Henry B Hansmann, 'The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise' (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal
835; Henry B Hansmann, 'Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law' (1981) 129 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 497.
7' Dennis R Young and Lester M Salamon, 'Commercialization, Social Ventures, and
For-Profit Competition' in Lester M Salamon (ed), The State of Nonprofit America (Brookings
Institution Press 2002) 424 ('nonprofits have accommodated themselves quite well to the
commercial pressures they are confronting . .. At the same time, it is far from clear whether
public understanding, or approval, has kept pace with the scope of the changes under way, with
the result that the sector's most precious asset of all - the public's trust - may increasingly be at
5

6

risk').
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protect the government's interest in providing its benefits to worthy enterprises, but
also whether the new reforms promote or detract from clear communication with
stakeholders - whether they cause 'brand confusion'.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it introduces the two primary ways in
which the law of nonprofit organizations attempts to regulate the boundary between the
nonprofit and business sector: restricting nonprofits to certain less commercial purposes; and imposing the non-distribution constraint. Second, the chapter roots commercial activity by nonprofits in a long history of fee-for-service nonprofit organizations
operating in similar ways to for-profit businesses, sometimes competing to provide the
very same services. While these commercial nonprofits have existed for some time,
industry observers agree that commercial nonprofits are growing and expanding the
ways in which they are challenging the traditional boundary between the nonprofit and
business sectors. Finally, the chapter introduces a series of new legal forms created to
facilitate so-called 'social enterprises'. These new business forms are very varied, and
largely disclaim access to the governmental benefits provided to nonprofits in order to
avoid the governmental regulation that comes with such benefits. But, they are each
more or less devoted to instituting some alternative regime to replace the 'branding'
function of membership in the traditional nonprofit sector, and are therefore of concern
to scholars of the nonprofit sector.

2. WHAT DISTINGUISHES A NONPROFIT?
As a practical matter, the law of nonprofits draws the boundary of the nonprofit sector
based on two types of distinctions between sectors. First, the nonprofit sector has
traditionally been confined to enterprises that pursue specified purposes. Second, the
nonprofit sector has been confined to enterprises that are prevented from distributing
their profits to private individuals - the so-called non-distribution constraint. Generally,
when we describe an enterprise as 'nonprofit' (or 'not-for-profit') we are referencing
the non-distribution constraint, the legal rule that makes a nonprofit a nonprofit. These
two broad categories of legal rules (purpose requirements and the non-distribution
constraint) apply differently to different classifications within the nonprofit sector, and
they apply differently in different legal jurisdictions. But they are both implicated in
our conceptions of the nonprofit sector, and it is worthwhile distinguishing between
them when discussing proposed changes to the law.
First, with respect to purpose, it is worth pointing out that many jurisdictions in the
US permit an enterprise to incorporate as a nonprofit (subject to the so-called
'non-distribution constraint') for any legal purposes, including a purely commercial
one. These jurisdictions do not require that a nonprofit have any special social
purpose. 8 Purely commercial nonprofit corporations do not qualify for tax or other
benefits (and are therefore not subject to any classification by the IRS), but they are
legally permitted to exist, and do exist in relatively small numbers. The vast majority of
8

For example, the American Bar Association, 'Model Nonprofit Corporation Act' (3rd edn,
2008) § 3.0l(a) states: 'Every nonprofit corporation has the purpose of engaging in any lawful
activity unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.'
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the nonprofit sector, however, consists of enterprises that are not only subject to the
non-distribution constraint, but also required to pursue some special social purpose
other than profit-making. In the US, tax benefits are provided to two broad types of
special-purpose nonprofits: charities and other organizations. Charitable organizations
are exempt from income taxes and their donors receive a deduction for donations to
them, 9 while non-charitable nonprofits may be exempt from tax on their income, but
their donors generally are not permitted a deduction. 10 Non-charitable nonprofits
include many types of special purpose organizations, like political organizations,
lobbying groups, social clubs, business leagues, and others. For the purposes of this
chapter, I will limit my discussion of the nonprofit sector to the 'charitable' sector, both
because most nonprofits in the US are charitable and because much of the scholarly
and popular interest in the commercialization of the nonprofit sector applies to
charities. Therefore, the most common special social purposes under discussion in this
chapter are charitable purposes, which are derived from the English common law of
charities.
As for the non-distribution constraint, it generally prevents nonprofits from distributing profits to private persons. That seems simple, but of course it is anything but. The
non-distribution constraint is permeable, because nonprofits can pay excessive compensation to employees, or make improper payments to other providers of goods or
services. They can similarly pay excessive returns on capital loaned to or invested in
them. In addition, in the US at least, a nonprofit that pays any 'equity-type' return on
capital has violated the rule, whether the return is excessive or not. 11 The specific ways
in which the non-distribution constraint might be breached are less important than the
general observation that the non-distribution constraint is the primary mechanism by
which the nonprofit sector is distinguished from the business sector.
The essence of the non-distribution constraint is an attempt to permit a wide range of
stalceholders - contributors, volunteers, employees, managers, entrepreneurs, beneficiaries, neighbours, governments - to trust that other stalceholders are prevented from
usurping any excess value created by the organization. 12 They all renounce the
appropriation of such excess value and agree that it should be used to advance the
organization's social purpose. Therefore, the legal parameters of the non-distribution
constraint may be perpetually contested, but its existence is widely believed to be at the
heart of what makes the nonprofit sector possible.
9
Charitable organizations, in this sense, are those classified under IRC § 50l(c)(3) (2005),
the most common classification for nonprofit organizations in the US: see McKeever et al. (n 2)
3 (Table 1.1 there shows that of the 1,549,264 tax-exempt entities that report to the IRS,
1,179,739 are classified under § 50l(c)(3), which is over 76 per cent, and that excludes most
churches and organizations with under $50,000 in gross receipts, which are not required to file).
10
This is of course a substantial simplification. There are actually 36 classifications of
tax-exempt organizations, each of which has slightly different legal treatment: see IRC § 501(c)
(2005).
11
See Hopkins (n 3) 574 § 20.6.
12
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, 'The "Independent" Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the
Limits of Autonomy' (2012) 65 Vanderbilt Law Review 51 (analysis of the ways the
non-distribution constraint fosters 'autonomy' in nonprofit organizations).
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Each of these legal mechanisms for guarding the boundary between the nonprofit and
business sectors is subject to contestation. It is an open question whether it is desirable
for nonprofits to be permitted to engage in essentially commercial activities, so long as
they are subject to the non-distribution constraint. Some question the usefulness of the
non-distribution constraint. And one may answer each question differently depending
on whether one is focused on the legal task of evaluating which organizations qualify
for government benefits, or on the legal task of assisting stakeholders in evaluating
which organizations are worthy of their heightened trust.

3. COMMERCIAL NONPROFITS AND JOINT VENTURES
In the United States, fee-for-service nonprofits have dominated the nonprofit sector for
decades. 13 This fee-for-service model is dominant largely because the largest institutions in the nonprofit sector are healthcare and education institutions that have relied
primarily on fees (payments for services and tuition) for a long time. While some of
these organizations receive substantial donative support, the overwhelming source of
their revenue is fees paid by persons purchasing their services (students or patients) or
their surrogates (parents or insurance, including government-provided insurance).
These fee-supported nonprofits have been called 'commercial' nonprofits to distinguish
them from 'donative' nonprofits, 14 and their relationship to both government subsidies
and the nonprofit 'brand' is distinct.
While fee-for-service nonprofits have always raised unique theoretical issues,
commentators have focused more and more attention on commerciality because of a
widely shared perception that it is growing in numerous different directions simultaneously.15 In many sectors, now, nonprofit providers compete with for-profit providers. In the healthcare context, for example, nonprofits exist alongside for-profit
13
See McKeever, Dietz, and Fyffe (n 2) 140-2 (Table 4.1 showing that 'sales receipts'
accounted for 72 per cent of nonprofit revenue in 2014, up from 69 per cent in 2004).
14 Hansmann (n 6).
15
See, eg, Dennis R Young and Lester Salamon, 'Commercialization, Social Ventures, and
For-Profit Competition' in Lester Salamon (ed), The State of Nonprofit America (Brookings
2002) 439-40 ('[i]n response to [a] combination of pressures and opportunities, nonprofit
organizations are drawing far closer to the market economy than perhaps at any time in their
history'). See also Peter Frumkin and Jonathan B lmbar (eds), In Search of the Nonprofit Sector
(Transaction Publication 2004); Burton Weisbrod, 'Conclusion' in Burton Weisbrod (ed), To
Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge
University Press 1998) 287 ('[n]onprofit organizations' commercial activities are bringing
revolutionary changes in traditional behavior, and in the process are blurring the distinction
between nonprofits and private firms'). In 1998, the prologue to this collection of essays by
economists stated that, '[n]ow [Weisbrod] and his colleagues have focused on a phenomenon
always extant but of growing significance: the commercialization of the nonprofit sector. Almost
all of what is known regarding this development is to be found in these pages': see Kenneth
Arrow, 'Foreword' in Burton Weisbrod (ed), To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial
Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge University Press 1998) ix. While no doubt
an overstatement even in 1998, the claim is certainly false now.
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entities providing services that are, in many instances, indistinguishable from their
for-profit competitors. 16
In the context of fee-for-service nonprofits, the question of how and where the legal
boundary between the nonprofit and business sector should be drawn is problematic.
Fee-for-service charities are capable of making significant profits, even without tax or
other subsidies, and yet the income of nonprofit providers is exempt from corporate
tax.17 Because of this, some commentators argue that commercial nonprofits should be
required to do more to justify their charitable status than they currently do. 18 Usually,
the criticism of commercial nonprofits focuses on the fact that they fail to sufficiently
take into account distributional concerns. In other words, they do not sufficiently serve
the poor. For example, in the medical context, US critics of existing nonprofit law have
argued that the purpose of 'promoting health' is an insufficient charitable purpose, and
hospitals should provide more 'charity care', or otherwise serve the poor.1 9 In the
educational context, US critics have argued that elite private universities (with large
endowments) insufficiently serve students who are unable to afford them (or improperly shift too much cost to students), and so they should be forced to spend a larger
proportion of their endowment reducing student cost. These criticisms are usually
focused on the 'subsidies' or benefits that nonprofit providers receive, and so the
question is simply: does the law require nonprofit providers to 'earn' their subsidies by
serving the poor, or not?20 If not, perhaps the subsidies should be removed.
Sometimes the critique of commercial nonprofits does not focus on distributional
concerns, but simply asserts that such operations are 'too commercial'. In fact, there is
a free-standing but extremely ill-defined 'commerciality' doctrine, which the IRS has
used to deny tax-exempt status to a whole number of firms whose operations are not
sufficiently distinguishable from for-profit participants in a particular market. 21 The
claim about commerciality is not about the non-distribution constraint, and these
commerciality-doctrine cases are not arguments that individuals are profiting from the
operation of the organization. Those claims would be 'private inurement' or 'private
benefit' claims. The claim here is a subcategory of the requirement that an organization
be operated for charitable purposes, and the idea is that an organization with an overly
'commercial hue' could not be so operated. 22 But in these cases, most examples involve
16

See Young and Salamon (n 15).
To the degree to which such organizations receive no donations, the tax deductibility of
donations is not an issue, although when they do receive donations it becomes one.
18
Underlying this debate is an empirical question about whether nonprofit service providers
behave differently from for-profits. For a study finding that they do behave differently in ways
that enhance the public good, see Jill R Horwitz, 'Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?' (2007) 24
Yale Journal on Regulation 139.
19
See Evelyn Brody, 'The 21st Century Fight Over Who Sets the Terms of the Charity
Property Tax Exemption' (2016) 77 Exempt Organization Tax Review 259.
20
See, eg, Miranda Perry Fleischer, 'Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of
Distributive Justice' (2010) 87 Washington University Law Review 505.
21
See, eg, John D Colombo, 'Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial
Activity by Charities' (2007) 76 Fordham Law Review 667.
22
It is perhaps worth pointing out that prior to 1950, the US adopted a 'destination of
income' test, which recognized the charitable status of commercial enterprises that devoted all of
17
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industry sectors historically dominated by for-profit firms, in which nonprofits are
seeking entry, and some of the argument is about competing with for-profit firms, or
using methods too similar to for-profit firms that do similar busirtess. 23 However, the
contours of this commerciality overlay to the charitable purposes tests are extremely
hard to define. 24 More fundamentally, there is no theoretical consensus on why
nonprofits should be required to differentiate themselves from 'ordinary' businesses, as
long as the non-distribution constraint is being enforced. 25
Thus, without focusing on any new stretching of boundaries or new phenomenon in
the law, it is apparent that the boundary between nonprofits and commercial activity is
not clear, and nor is it clearly theorized. For the purposes of determining which
organizations should receive government subsidies through the tax code, there is a
sense that a line needs to be drawn that adequately directs subsidies to enterprises that
accomplish (or at least seek to accomplish) 'special' social purposes, and some
boundary is needed to distinguish these enterprises from 'ordinary' commercial
operations. For the purposes of 'branding' however, it may well be that the nondistribution constraint is sufficient to communicate to stakeholders the 'specialness' of
the firm in question. After all, the hotchpotch of factors that seem to play into a
determination of commerciality do not seem especially useful for that purpose. But, if
stal(eholders are relying on the non-distribution constraint, then structures that permit
the distribution of profits under certain circumstances might weaken the sector.
Issues related to the commerciality of nonprofits have been significantly complicated
in the United States by an increase in the use of various combinations of business
forms in the nonprofit sector in the last several decades. Traditionally in the US,
determinations about tax exemption have been made on an entity-by-entity basis, so
that the activities of a separately incorporated for-profit subsidiary of a nonprofit parent
would not be used to determine if the parent qualifies for tax-exempt status. Likewise,
a subsidiary's commercial activities are not imputed to its parent, as long as the
subsidiary is housed in a separate corporation. However, if an organization engages in
those activities 'directly' or through a joint venture (including a partnership or business
form taxed as a partnership), the business activities would be imputed to the parent.
their income to chality (so-called 'feeders'), but in 1950 Congress changed the law to deny
tax-exempt status to feeder organizations. Recently, the status of feeder organizations was raised
in Australia. See, generally, Kerry O'Halloran, The Profits of Charity (OUP 2012) 493-4.
23
See, eg, Hopkins (n 3) 134 § 4.ll(a) ('[a]n activity is a commercial one if it has a direct
counterpart in, or is conducted in the same or similar manner as in, the realm of for-profit
organizations ... having stated the essence of the doctrine, it must also be said that it is unevenly
applied').
24
For example, a leading scholar of the commerciality doctrine stated that '[i]n short, the
Treasury Regulations, IRS interpretations and litigating positions, and court cases all seem to be
inconsistent in judging when commercial activity should result in loss of exempt status':
Colombo (n 21) 678.
25
See, eg, Hopkins (n 3) 135 § 4. ll(b) ('[i]n short, the assumptions underlying tl1e rationale
for the commerciality doctrine are severely flawed. Some of the assumptions are not in
accordance with law requirements and/or common sense. A few of these assumptions are
outmoded. All of this is exacerbated by the IRS's overly aggressive application of the
commerciality doctrine').
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If a partnership engages in commercial activities and makes a profit, that profit is
taxable to the degree to which it is attributable to any for-profit partner, but may be
exempt to the degree to which it is attributable to a tax-exempt partner. 26 This state of
affairs has resulted in a number of rulings about joint ventures (and other similar
arrangements) between tax-exempt nonprofits and taxable businesses. The outcome of
these rulings (at least to date) has been relatively permissive towards commercial joint
ventures that advance the tax-exempt purposes of the nonprofit parent, with very little
free-standing commerciality discussion. In effect, so long as the joint venture is
controlled by the charitable parent, and advances the parent's charitable purpose, then
the venture's commerciality does not impact the parent's qualification for tax-exempt
status. Neither does the fact that it distributes profits to any commercial co-venturers.
Joint ventures are especially useful to create 'hybrid' business entities that can
address some of the criticisms that social enterprise reformers make of the nonprofit
sector. For example, one of the most fundamental critiques of the nonprofit form is that
the non-distribution constraint prevents nonprofits from raising capital from 'equity'
investors. Because equity is often preferable to debt when a venture is risky, and
because nonprofits often have difficulty accessing debt financing, this impediment can
be significant. 27 Nonprofits that structure a social enterprise as a joint venture can
potentially raise donated (tax-deductible) capital through their nonprofit partner, and
commercial debt or equity capital through their for-profit partner(s), thus delivering a
true 'hybrid' enterprise structure. The activities of the joint venture are attributed to the
nonprofit, so there is still a burden to show that those activities are in furtherance of the
nonprofit's tax-exempt purposes if the activities are substantial.28 But many social
enterprises could presumably meet this test. 29
In determining whether joint ventures negatively impact the tax exemption of their
nonprofit partners, the IRS has focused on control. If the tax-exempt partner controls
the joint venture, and if the joint venture otherwise advances the nonprofit's tax-exempt
purpose, then there is no problem. If the joint venture is controlled by for-profit
partners, then no matter how it behaves, the IRS does not consider it to be advancing
the tax-exempt purpose of the nonprofit. 30 In that case, if the joint venture's activities
are substantial in relation to those of the nonprofit, then the nonprofit would no longer
26

The question of taxability of this income would be evaluated under the rules on the
unrelated business income tax (UBIT): see IRC § 512.
27
In fact, it is this restriction on business sources of capital that justifies tax benefits in the
eyes of some: see, eg, Mark P Gergen, 'The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction'
(1988) 74 Virginia Law Review 1393; Henry Hansmann, 'The Rationale for Exempting
Nonprofit Organizations from the Corporate Income Tax' (1981) 91 Yale Law Journal 54.
28
There also may be other legal issues, most importantly private inurement or private benefit
issues. For a discussion of private inurement and private benefit in a social enterprise joint
venture or hybrid situation, see Benjamin M Leff, 'Preventing Private lnurement in Tranched
Social Enterprises' (2015) 45 Seton Hall Law Review 1.
29
See generally Michael I Sanders, Joint Ventures Involving Tax Exempt Organizations ( 4th
edn, Wiley 2013).
30
The leading case on this issue is still St David's Health Care System v United States 349
F 3d 232 (5th Cir, 2003).
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qualify for tax-exempt status. 31 Relying so heavily on control presumably reflects the
theory that the key to a joint venture being protected from abuse by its for-profit
partners is the supervision of the nonprofit directors. So long as they are subject to the
non-distribution constraint, then in effect they can be trusted to oversee the joint
venture such that it will not divert resources from the nonprofit mission, even as it pays
an investment return to its for-profit investors.
This approach is still very much being developed, and is subject to considerable
contestation. Since profits are taxed to the degree that they are attributable to the
non-charitable partner(s), thus potentially neutralizing the tax exemption question, joint
ventures raise the issue of how important the 'branding' function of nonprofit law is.
When a charity operates a commercial subsidiary, along with profit-making partners, to
advance a substantial part of its charitable purpose, do stakeholders have sufficient
information to know how much to 'trust' that enterprise?

4. 'SOCIAL ENTERPRISES' AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE
NON-DISTRIBUTION CONSTRAINT
As discussed above, much of the expansion of commercialism in the nonprofit sector is
caused by innovation among nonprofits pushing legal boundaries. The law in the US in
this area is arguably in a state of flux. It is permissible for nonprofits to use hybrid
forms (like joint ventures) to combine traditional charities with for-profit businesses,
thereby opening up the possibility of combining capital from charitable sources with
capital from profit-seeking investors. But this development of joint ventures comes
from squarely within the nonprofit sector, seeking a solution to the problem of
nonprofits accessing capital or other resources from the business sector. Some perceive
these innovations as alarming, while others believe that joint ventures do not go far
enough. These thinkers seek to radically re-envision the relationship between business
entities and socially beneficial purposes through so-called 'social enterprises' .32
The 'social enterprise' movement has advocated for new business forms to populate
what is sometimes described as a 'fourth sector' .33 This social enterprise movement is
both a critique of traditional charities (which are perceived as insufficiently entrepreneurial and overly reliant on donations or government support), and of traditional
business enterprises (which are perceived as overly concerned with profit maximization
for shareholders). A number of jurisdictions have been experimenting with new legal
forms for social enterprises, which stretch the boundary between nonprofits and
businesses even further. Some of these business forms retain the non-distribution
31

If the activities of the joint venture are insubstantial in relation to the activities of the
tax-exempt partner, then the joint venture is an 'ancillary joint venture,' and 'the question
remains whether control is needed in the ancillary joint venture setting': Hopkins (n 3) 1236
§ 31.4.
32
See, generally, Robert A Katz and Antony Page, 'The Role of Social Enterprise' (2010) 35
Vermont Law Review 59.
33
See Thomas Kelley, 'Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier' (2009)
84 Tulane Law Review 337, 340.
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constraint, some modify it, and some do away with it completely. If seen simply as a
reform of the business sector, these new social enterprise business forms would have
few implications for nonprofit law. But because they use the law to create a social
enterprise brand - one that has the potential to compete or be confused with the
nonprofit brand - they are more than just a reform of business law, and are worthy of
study in a volume about the nonprofit sector.
The 'social enterprise' movement has challenged both (i) the fundamental idea that
socially beneficial activities should be confined to a list of traditional purposes and
(ii) the fundamental idea that the non-distribution constraint is necessary for socialpurpose activities. Some social enterprise supporters argue that social good can be
pursued in a wide range of activities that seem more commercial than charitable (such
as providing goods or services to low income people, or providing regular goods while
committing to directing some profits to a social goal). Some also argue that the
non-distribution constraint is unnecessary and prevents some worthwhile organizations
devoted to social purposes from operating effectively. 34 Both types generally argue that
the boundary between businesses and nonprofits is too sharply drawn. Some may use
language that suggests that the boundary should be done away with altogether, but their
proposed reforms generally are much more modest and seek to facilitate the pursuit of
social purposes by for-profit firms or facilitate socially beneficial commercial activity
by nonprofits. 35 Most social enterprise advocates are not legal scholars at all, and many
of their proposals are directed at changing the culture of business, charity, philanthropy,
nonprofit management, for-profit management, and other things. But there is a general
call for changes to the law to facilitate social enterprises, and these social enterprise
legal reformers have lobbied legislatures to create a multitude of new legal forms that
purport to solve a variety of problems associated with this too-rigid boundary.
This social enterprise legal movement has sought to develop new legal forms to
house such social enterprises in a single 'off-the-rack' entity, rather than in traditional
businesses or charities, or in specialized joint venture arrangements. These new social
enterprise legal forms are, on the one hand, more radical than joint ventures because
they attempt to create something new to address the problems raised by mixing social
and business interests. On the other hand, because they largely disclaim any attempt to
qualify as tax exempt or be considered charities, they disclaim the. governmental
benefits available to the nonprofit sector, and only implicate what we have been calling
branding concerns. These new business forms include Low Income Limited Liability
Companies, Benefit Corporations, Social Purpose Corporations, and Flexible Purpose
Corporations in the US, and Community Interest Companies in the UK. 36
34
Some of the strongest advocates for social enterprises that serve the poor strongly disagree
with those who wish to remove the non-distribution constraint. For example, Muhammad Yunus
insists that 'social businesses' should not distribute profits to investors but should reinvest
proceeds to serve their mission: Muhammad Yunus, Building Social Business: The New Kind of
Capitalism that Serves Humanity's Most Pressing Needs (PublicA:ffairs 2010).
35
See generally Anup Malani and Eric A Posner, 'The Case for For-Profit Charities' (2007)
93 Virginia Law Review 2017, 2065; M Todd Henderson and Anup Malani, 'Corporate
Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism' (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review 571.
36
See Robert T Esposito, 'The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit
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The social enterprise legal reformers have proposed these new business forms with
two goals in mind. First, social enterprise legal reformers critique what they describe as
the overly restrictive nature of both charity law and business law. In response to these
restrictions, they call for legal forms that are less restrictive; an impulse I call
'de-regulatory' .37 From the business-law side, they argue that company law requires
for-profit businesses to maximize shareholder profit, and that profit-maximization
prevents social enterprises from seeking to advance their social missions. Therefore,
they seek legal refonns that permit social enterprises to pursue social mission over
profit. Many legal scholars argue that this critique is largely unfounded, at least in the
US, since the so-called 'business judgment rule' permits the directors of a business
much discretion, and most states explicitly permit directors to consider factors other
than profit maximization in exercising their judgment. 38 In any case, these
de-regulatory goals are met easily, since profit-maximization rules in US corporate law
can generally be overruled by clear communications to shareholders.
From the nonprofit and charity-law side, these reformers sometimes argue that
traditional charitable purposes are too narrow, and they complain that the nondistribution constraint prevents socially beneficial investment by providers of capital. 39
Thus, they seek a business form that permits entrepreneurs to attract investment from
capital markets that demand a share of the profits of the firm .. These social enterprise
legal reformers seek to '.deregulate' charity law so their enterprises can pursue their
socially beneficial purposes as effectively as possible, no matter how much of their
profits they pay to their investors.
But, these legal reformers rarely propose purely de-regulatory legal reforms. Instead,
they appear to be acutely conscious of the need to distinguish enterprises that genuinely
pursue social goals from those that merely seek to maximize profits. That is, it seems
clear that entities that seek to advance the social good want to be able to make credible
commitments about the social value of their work to their various constituencies, and

Corporation' (2013) 4 William and Mary Business Law Review 639, 671 (discussing US entities
and contrasting them with those of the UK and continental Europe). This chapter is focused on
the social enterprise movement in the US, with some discussion of the UK. The movement in
continental Europe is different enough that a separate treatment would be warranted: see
generally Rory Ridley-Duff and Mike Bull, Understanding Social Enterprise: Theory and
Practice (2nd edn, Sage 2015) 167 (distinguishing between US-style 'social purpose enterprises'
and EU-style 'socialized enterprises').
37 For a discussion of the 'deregulatory' and 'regulatory' impulses of the social enterprise
movement, see Leff, 'Preventing Private Inurement' (n 28) 4-7.
38
See, eg, Einer Elhauge, 'Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest' (2005) 80
New York University Law Review 733, 763. But social enterprise advocates generally point to
eBay Domestic Holdings Inc v Newmark, 16 A 3d 1 (Del Ch 2010) (holding that the
implementation of an anti-takeover measure designed to protect a private company's corporate
culture breached the directors' fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value).
39
They also sometimes argue that restrictions on compensation prevent social enterprises
from attracting talent, but they generally misunderstand the actual state of law, in the US at least,
with respect to nonprofit compensation: see, eg, Benjamin M Leff, 'The Case against For-Profit
Charity' (2012) 42 Seton Hall Law Review 819, 839-44.
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they se_ek supp01t from the law to enable them to make such commitments.40 In other
words, they want the law to provide them with a credible 'brand' to communicate to
stakeholders their commitment to the social good and to distinguish them from firms
that are not so committed. 41 I call this element of their proposals 'regulatory', since it
attempts to replace some regulation of social enterprises, once the traditional boundary
between charities and commercial businesses is removed. The central concern of most
scholarly critics of these new legal forms is that they do too little to provide an actually
effective mechanism for distinguishing social enterprises from regular ones; and so
there is the risk that the social enterprise label will fail to become an effective brand, or,
worse, will mislead constituencies into believing that enterprises adopting the new
forms are something that they are not. 42 Of course, there is also the risk that social
enterprises will improperly associate themselves with the brand of nonprofits, thereby
weakening the nonprofit brand. 43
The prehistory of modern social enterprise legal forms is probably the cooperative
movement of the nineteenth century. Critiques of the excesses of profit-maximizing
capitalists produced workers' collectives and consumer coops, like those famously
formed by workers in Rochdale, England. The Rochdale model required workers or
consumers to collectively supply capital to their ventures, and initially paid a limited
five per cent return on such capital, although later moved away from paying dividends
measured by investment amount. 44 These enterprises were distinguished from other
businesses by their democratic character: ultimate decisions were made by patrons or
workers, not by shareowners. It is the expansion of this cooperative movement in
continental Europe that initially laid claim to the term social enterprise, and it gave rise
to a wave of social enterprise lawmaldng, as country after country in Europe adopted
new legal forms to permit the spread of democratically controlled businesses for a
number of different purposes. 45
If the history of cooperatives represents a source of the social enterprise movement
that emphasizes democratic decision-making as the distinguishing characteristic from
ordinary businesses, philanthropist/owners also experimented with mechanisms to
40
They fear that their efforts will be perceived as no more than corporate puffery, often
called 'greenwashing' in the environmental context.
41
See, eg, Dana Brakman Reiser, 'Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise' (2013) 62 Emory
Law Journal 681, 684 ('for the adoption of a specialized legal fmm to indicate that an entity
actually is different, it must impose a new and unambiguous baseline standard and provide for
its reliable enforcement. Only by doing so can a specialized legal form reach the ultimate goal of
social entrepreneurs who seek them: to become a brand.').
42
See, eg, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer and Joseph R Ganahl, 'Taxing Social Enterprise' (2014) 66
Stanford Law Review. 387, 397 ('Many commentators opposed the creation of L3Cs [because
they believed that L3Cs] simply represented a desire to trade on the cachet of government
imprimatur').
43
Richard Steinberg and Bradford H Gray, "'The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise" in 1993:
Hansmann Revisited' (1993) 22 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 297, 303 ('[t]hese
for-profits in disguise as nonprofits would degrade the quality of the "nonprofit seal of
approval"').
44
See Steve Leikein, The Practical Utopians: American Workers and the Cooperative
Movement in the Gilded Age (Wayne State University Press 2005) 3-5.
45
See generally Ridley-Duff and Bull (n 36).
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engage in what they may well have called social enterprise, had the term yet been
introduced. For example, Nathan Mayer Rothschild created the so-called 'Four-Percent
Industrial Dwelling Company', which built worker housing in London, limiting the
return on capital to only four per cent. There was no special legal form, and the
purpose - providing housing to workers - was something that plenty of regular
profit-oriented businesses did. But Rothschild put the limitation on return of capital
right in the name of the company, in order to communicate that there was an aspect of
philanthropy in the enterprise. It is this strain of social enterprise that has been
developing in the US, and to a slightly lesser degree in the UK, and it has spurred the
creation of very different new legal forms.
These new legal forms were created for a variety of purposes, but it is useful to
identify the way each one deals with the legal boundary between the nonprofit and
business sectors. 46 In other words, to what extent do these new business forms create a
regulatory regime that has the potential to enable stakeholders to distinguish between
social enterprises and 'ordinary' businesses, assuming that such differentiation is one of
the goals of the new forms? Specifically:
(i)

these new legal forms deal differently with the 'purposes' requirements that ·
restrict charitable organizations under current law;
(ii) these new forms have different requirements with respect to the non-distribution
constraint; and
(iii) they deal with legal enforcement issues differently.
Some are more innovative than others, and with more innovation, of course, comes
more risk of harm.
Before any new legal forms were introduced in the US, the UK introduced the
Community Interest Company (CIC) in 2004. A CIC has wide latitude in the purposes
it pursues, although its activities must be carried on 'for the benefit of the community' .47 With respect to the non-distribution constraint, all CICs are subject to an
'asset lock'. The asset lock prevents CICs from selling their assets at below-market
rates, and from distributing their assets to owners or others on dissolution of the
company. However, they are permitted, if they choose, to distribute operational profits
to investors or owners, subject to a 'dividend cap'. CICs may also choose to operate
'by guarantee', which means that they will not distribute any profits to shareholders.
Thus, the social-enterprise legal form first adopted in the UK provides an expansion of
purpose to include any social purpose, and a relaxation, but not complete removal, of
the non-distribution constraint. Most importantly, the UK created a new regulatory
body to police CICs and enforce compliance with the law. This regulator also provides
a means to continue to refine definitional issues, like what social purposes will be
permitted to CICs, and so permits an evolving approach to social enterprise law.
In the US, the first new social enterprise legal form to be enacted was the Low
Income Limited Liability Company (L3C), first adopted by the state of Vermont in
46

For a good comparative analysis of the new social enterprise legal forms, see, eg, Reiser,
'Theorizing Fonns for Social Enterprise' (n 41).
47 The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1788, reg 4.
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2008. Urilike the CIC, L3C statutes purposely mimic the 'purposes' requirement found
in charity law, requiring that an L3C operate to 'significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes', and '[n]o significant purpose
of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property' .48 Also
unlike the CIC, an L3C has no explicit restrictions on its ability to distribute profits to
its members. Supporters claimed that the explicit prioritizing of social purpose over
profits would signal to members that profits were likely to be low, but there is no legal
requirement that profits be limited. Finally, because an L3C is not a tax-exempt entity,
it avoids all federal regulation of nonprofits, Some have argued that state regulators
would continue to have jurisdiction over L3Cs, at least sometimes, 49 but state
regulation of nonprofits has been crit:fcized as being inconsistent and lax. Thus, as a
social enterprise business form, the L3C seem.s to provide little or no enforceable
assurance to its stakeholders that it is different in any meaningful way from an ordinary
business.
The lack of legal restrictions presumably comes from the L3C's history. Its initial
express purpose was to facilitate investments not by individuals, but by so-called
'private foundations' - a subcategory of charity in the US subject to a stricter
regulatory regime than public charities. The L3C mimicked the regulatory language
that authorized so-called 'program related investments', in an attempt to persuade
private foundations that investing in L3Cs would qualify as program related. When the
IRS declined to issue guidance supporting the idea that an investment in an L3C
automatically qualified as a program-related investment, most commentators concluded
that the form did not succeed in its primary purpose, or even that it was 'inherently
misleading'. 50
Thus, the L3C was initially intended to facilitate a structure like the joint venture
structure described above, in which sophisticated charitable entities were deeply
involved in how the social enterprise operated. Because of that, it was subject to the
same basic logic that the IRS has taken with respect to joint ventures - that as long as
the charitable directors are in charge of ensuring that the new venture advances the
charity's charitable purpose, and as long as they control the terms under which any
profits are distributed, ther<? is no presumptive violation of the charity's qualifications.
The L3C appears to have moved beyond its beginnings as a vehicle for investments
by private foundations and is being pitched as a useful legal form for free-standing
social enterprises with for-profit investors.51 Currently eight states (and two Native
11 VSA § 4162 (2015).
See, eg, Dana Brakman Reiser, 'Regulating Social Enterprise' (2014) 14 University of
California Davis Business Law Journal 231, 240-5. Notably, the Illinois L3C statute, unlike
others, defines the directors of an L3C as charitable tiustees under the state's Charitable Trust
Act, triggering obligations to and oversight of the Illinois Attorney General: at 235.
50
Daniel S Kleinberger, 'A Myth Deconstructed: The Emperor's New Clothes on the
Low-Income Limited Liability Company' (2010) 35 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 879,
881.
51
See John Tyler, 'Negating the Legal Problem of Having "Two Masters": A Framework for
L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability' (2010) 35 Vermont Law Review 117, 125 (arguing
that L3Cs are not only meant to attract investment from charitable foundations).
48
49
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American Tribes) authorize L3Cs, and an estimated 1,560 have been created. 52 As a
free-standing social enterprise vehicle, the L3C appears to be an attempted 'brand' with
no institutional mechanism to protect the interests of stakeholders who want to preserve
the social mission. Even though it technically does not broaden the authorized purposes
beyond those that apply to charities, the lack of a regulator may permit de facto broader
purposes. The L3C has no restriction on distributing its profits to owners and, because
it has no new mechanism to enforce the primacy of its social purpose, its commitment
to such purposes may prove weak.
Starting in 2012, state legislatures began to enact statutes creating a new social
enterprise business form, the Benefit Corporation. 53 Benefit Corporation statutes were
enacted in response to lobbying by the founders of a nonprofit organization called
B Lab, which had created a system of certifying the social benefit of social enterprises,
an attempt to use private means to create a brand for social enterprises. Unlike the L3C,
the Benefit Corporation is not designed to attract investment from entities that are
already committed to charitable missions, but is instead designed to attract investors
who want to support social enterprises directly. Because of that, the form does away
with the concept of prioritizing some specific social benefit purpose over shareholder
returns, and instead requires only that an enterprise be operated for 'a general public
benefit'. What exactly a general public benefit is remains largely undefined, except that
the statutes generally require that it be 'comprehensive' and that it be 'measured against
a third party standard'.
This concept of a third party standard is central to the Benefit Corporation, and it
reflects the law's connection to B Lab. This third-party standard provides almost
limitless variation in what could constitute a public benefit, but requires a Benefit
Corporation to find a reputable organization (like B Lab) to create a standard against
which the Corporation can measure its progress, although it does not require the
Corporation to have the third party measure its conformance to the standard. Thus, the
Benefit Corporation constitutes a radical rethinking of how the law should recognize
organizations that serve the public good, completely discarding the historical list of
charitable purposes.
As for the non-distribution constraint, the Benefit Corporation statutes permit any
amount of profit distribution. Because Benefit Corporation laws do not create nonprofit
organizations, Benefit Corporations do not qualify for tax exemption. That means that
they are unregulated by the IRS. While no new regulator is created to enforce their
compliance with their social purposes, the Benefit Corporation statutes generally
substitute attempts at transparency and direct accountability for the existence of any
regulator. With thirty-one different Benefit Corporation statutes, there is now a
significant amount of variation about what exactly the form requires, especially with
regard to mechanisms for stakeholders to enforce pursuit of the social mission.
52

See 'L3C Tally' (interSector Partners, L3C, 15 August 2017) <http://www.intersector
13c.com/13c> accessed 27 September 2017. Prior to 1 January 2014, there were nine states that
authorised L3Cs, but North Carolina repealed its L3C law.
53 As of September 2017, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have passed Benefit
Corporation statutes: 'State by State Status of Legislation' (Benefit Corporation, 2017) <http://
www.benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status> accessed 27 September 2017.
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Generally, the statutes require some form of reporting to stakeholders about progress
toward social goals, but very little in the way of other tools for stakeholders to enforce
specific actions towards such goals.
Many of the statutes provide for some kind of limited cause of action by some
specific stakeholders to enforce pursuit of social goals, but the limitations generally
make the cause of action unlikely to ever bring much relief. Thus, while the Benefit
Corporation statutes discard both the traditional purposes requirements and the nondistribution constraint, they do attempt to create new mechanisms to permit the
corporation to make credible commitments to stakeholders about the entity's specialness, even if those new mechanisms to date seem hard for stakeholders to interpret or
understand.
Not completely satisfied with the possibilities provided by the Benefit Corporation
form, California created the 'Flexible Purpose Corporation' in 2011 (on the same day it
enacted its Benefit Corporation statute), and Washington State followed in 2012 by
enacting the 'Social Purpose Corporation' (SPC). 54 Subsequently, California changed
the name of its Flexible Purpose Corporations to Social Purpose Corporations. 55 SPCs
share some aspects of the Benefit Corporation, such as the requirement that they malce
publicly available reports about the activities that support their social purposes, but they
are not required to measure their progress against a third-party standard. The SPC
permits social enterprises to identify their own social purposes, purposes that can be
less comprehensive than those required of Benefit Corporations. These social purposes
. can be anything 'intended to promote positive ... effects of, or minimize adverse ...
effects of, the corporation upon any or all of [a list of stakeholders that includes] the
local, state, national, or world community' .56
It is surely an understatement to say that this definition of the purposes of a SPC is
broad. Critics have complained that this 'combination of unchecked directorial power
and lack of standardized and independent reporting requirements . . . have historically
been poor bedfellows for social and envimnmental progress' .57 In other words, SPCs
suffer from the same problems as Benefit Corporations, but possibly in a higher degree
- they do not provide any clear signal to stakeholders that they are worthy of a higher
level of trust or regard than any other business.
It is possible to malce a few observations about the new social enterprise legal forms
in the US. First, to the degree to which they do not implicate tax subsidies or other
governmental benefits, the burden on the law is lighter than the burden of 'nonprofit
law.58 On that score, there is no need to criticize them for being less effective than
nonprofit law at identifying worthy enterprises. If they were purely de-regulatory, and
54

See, eg, Esposito (n 36) 692-4; Reiser, 'Regulating Social Enterprise' (n 49).
Currently, the only state other than California and Washington to have a Social Purpose
Corporation statute is Florida.
56 RCW 23B,25.020 (2016).
57
Robert T Esposito, 'The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on
Hybrid Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit
Corporation' (2013) 4 William and Mary Business Law Review 639, 692.
58
For a thorough discussion of the arguments for extending tax benefits to social enterprises,
that concludes that such extension is not warranted, see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer and Joseph R
Ganahl, 'Taxing Social Enterprise' (2014) 66 Stanford Law Review 387.
55
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only had the effect of permitting for-profit businesses to relax the requirement to
maximize shareholder wealth, they would be relatively uncontroversial. However, they
are not purely de-regulatory. Rather, they are designed to permit stakeholders to
differentiate social enterprises from ordinary businesses. Supporters believe that
stakeholders will treat social enterprises preferentially, either by investing in them,
buying their products or services, preferring to work for them, appreciating them as
neighbours, or other things. For social enterprises to succeed at this goal, they must
create a recognizable brand, and that brand must enable them to make credible
commitments to their stakeholders.
The second observation is that the law has a role in enabling social enterprises to
make such commitments. In nonprofit law, that role is fulfilled by a purposes
requirement, the non-distribution constraint, and a regulatory body to enforce the rules.
If social enterprise laws are to do away with any or all of these tools, they must
substitute something else. That is why these new laws are interesting. In the UK, the
CIC form does not completely do away with the non-distribution constraint, but permits
distribution of profits up to a restricted amount. But even more importantly, the UK
legislation creates a new regulatory body to define and police a new evolving set of
permissible purposes. In the US, where no new regulatory agency is created, and where
the IRS is the most active regulator of the nonprofit sector, the fact that the new social
enterprise legal forms avoid IRS regulation opens a void.
That void is filled by L3Cs in the same way that other joint ventures and hybrid
structures are regulated: to· the degree to which there is a tax-exempt partner, that
partner must control the joint venture if its activities are substantial with respect to the
nonprofit. However, if there is no tax-exempt partner, there is no regulation. In the case
of Benefit Corporations, a wide variety of mechanisms are provided to substitute for
government oversight. Benefit Corporations have more robust reporting requirements
than other for-profit businesses; they must evaluate themselves against a third-party
standard; they may have a special director who has individual responsibility to monitor
social benefit; and they may have some very limited opportunity for stakeholders to
bring a suit if they depart completely from their social purposes.
These mechanisms are exciting because they are new, but there is very little evidence
that they will prove as effective as the non-distribution constraint as a commitment
device for social enterprises. 59 For many social entrepreneurs, the question that needs
answering is whether the social enterprise brand will be effective at drawing stakeholders who value those things that social enterprises offer. But that is not the right
question for legal scholars. For legal scholars, the right question is whether the
branding of social enterprises communicates something important about them, or
whether it operates as a kind of fraud, confusing stakeholders and providing them with
something that is not real. Even more importantly, if this social enterprise brand draws
59
See Dana Brakman Reiser, 'Benefit Corporations -A Sustainable Form of Organization?'
(2011) 46 Wake Forest Law Review 591, 592-3 ('like the other hybrid forms simultaneously
under development, the benefit corporation lacks robust mechanisms to enforce dual mission,
which will ultimately undermine its ability to ... create a strong brand for social enterprise as
sustainable organizations').

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3550171

188 Research handbook on not-for-profit law
on the 'nonprofit seal of approval' 60 to create brand confusion with nonprofit
enterprises, then it could negatively affect the value created by the non-distribution
constraint to the detriment of the nonprofit sector.

5. CONCLUSION
At its heart, the central question about the boundary between the nonprofit and business
sectors is, surely, whether there is a justification for a legal boundary at all. As it stands
today, the primary purposes for the legal boundary are twofold - first, to identify those
enterprises worthy of government-provided benefits like tax exemption, and second, to
create a brand that enables stakeholders to identify enterprises worthy of their
heightened trust, labour, capital, goodwill, patronage, or other things. Extensions of
nonprofit enterprises into more and more commercial activities - whether within
traditional charities, using hybrid structures, or using new social enterprise business
forms - stretches and muddles the boundary, to the degree to which it was ever clear.
Reforms to nonprofit law implicate both purposes: benefit-worthiness as well as brand
recognition. New social enterprise business models, to the degree to which they
disclaim tax and other government benefits, implicate only the branding issue, but by
avoiding nonprofit law, they demand other legal solutions.
The important question for legal scholars, then, is whether one type of boundaryshifting legal reform is more 'dangerous' than another. On the one hand, hybrid models
and expansions of the permissible activities of tax-exempt nonprofits are more
dangerous because they implicate governmental subsidies, and because they directly
affect the brand of the nonprofit or charitable sector itself. On the other hand, new
social enterprise business forms, to the degree to which they create brand confusion or
call into question the usefulness of the nonprofit sector at all, may be more dangerous
in the long run. At their heart, these are empirical questions. In any case, there is no
sign that innovation - including legal innovation - is likely to stop, and that is a good
thing. Only innovation around the boundary will lead to a more clearly theorized and
justified legal regime that permits both the business and nonprofit sectors to do a better
job of advancing the social good.

60

Steinberg and Gray (n 43) 303.
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